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The two European Union anti-discrimination directives passed in 2000 have started to be 
implemented across the EU, and a draft law was sent to the Greek Parliament in January 2004 
for consideration. These directives extend the previous ‘hard’ EC anti-discrimination law from 
its existing narrow focus on gender to cover discrimination in employment on a variety of 
grounds, and even more widely prohibiting discrimination on the grounds of racial or ethnic 
origin in almost all areas of socio-economic relations.  
 
It is argued here, that this policy shift marks a new era in the relationship between the individual 
and the Union. For the first time, the Union has addressed racial discrimination and its own 
previous exclusionary policies, as well as establishing formal procedures to deal with 
discrimination in employment on the grounds of race, ethnic origin, religion, religious beliefs, 
disability, age and sexual orientation. Although presented simply as rights, these rights constitute 
the germ of a European ‘social citizenship’ – perhaps analogous to the emergence of welfare 
states in post-war Europe. In addition, the Charter of Fundamental Rights is clearly a political 
declaration of such social citizenship, although never actually labelled as such. 
  
In this paper, I try to unravel the meaning of the new laws for Greece as well as for the Balkans 
more generally. Implicit in this approach is the idea that a policy forged by northern European 
advanced capitalist economies may well not be appropriate for some less developed countries. In 
fact, even different levels of economic development may not be the primary issue: types of 
socio-economic development could well be more crucial.  
 
I begin with a brief exposition of the EU directives themselves, and then go on to look at the 
apparent origins of anti-discrimination measures at the European national level. The subsequent 
section examines the linkage between economic development, socio-economic structures, labour 
force participation and the evolution of anti-discrimination measures across the wider Europe.  2
Finally, the concluding section assesses the likely meaning for Greece and other Balkan 
countries in dealing with the new anti-discrimination requirements. 
 
A brief comment on methodology is in order here: owing to the general lack of (effective) anti-
racism policies and also data on such discrimination, it is necessary for our purposes to focus 
upon the experiences of anti-discrimination policies dealing with gender. However, there is 
ample evidence from the few countries which have seriously embarked upon policies for racial 





THE EU DIRECTIVES 
Following the pattern of sex equality regulation, but now with the new legal base of EC Article 
13, new anti-discrimination measures have been passed which explicitly address race and ethnic 
origin (Dir. 2000/43/EC), religion, religious belief , disability, age and sexual orientation (Dir. 
2000/78/EC). Furthernore, these directives do not simply replicate the old provisions of gender 
equality, but introduce “new definitions and understandings of key concepts…[and] pay far more 
attention to securing effective enforcement”.
2 In particular, race and ethnic origin receive very 
high degrees of protection, partly through the emergence of the Jorg Haider fiasco during the 
discussion period in Council.
3   
 
The origin of EU anti-discrimination provision lies in the 1957 Treaty of Rome in the form of 
protection of women’s pay – inserted in the Treaty on the insistence of France, which had feared 
unfair competition from other countries which were allegedly less equal in gendered pay 
differentials.
4 Twenty years later, the strong Treaty base along with the new political correctness 
of women’s equality – partly through the political power of the feminist movement – provided 
the European Commission with fertile ground for enlarging the scope of activities undertaken 
directly by the EU. Thus, we can analyse this area of policy-making as the direct result of 
political influences in the process of European law-making, and rather little to do with human or 
social rights as such. Similarly, the two recent directives appear to have as their origin, political 
                                                  
1 P. A. RIACH and J. RICH, «Field Experiments of Discrimination in the Market Place», The Economic 
Journal 112 (2002), p. F480-F518. 
2 L. WADDINGTON AND M. BELL, «More Equal than Others: Distinguishing European Union Equality 
Directives», Common Market Law Review 38 (2001), pp. 587-611. 
3 A. TYSON, «The Negotiation of the European Community Directive on Racial Discrimination»,  
European Journal of Migration and Law 3 (2001), p. 218. 
4 D. SCHIEK, «A New Framework on Equal Treatment of Persons in EC Law?», European Law Journal 
8/2 (2002), p 292.  3
interest in attempting to legitimate the European idea, to embrace political correctness, and to 
allow the Commission to indulge in some policymaking. Also, the role of the Starting Line 
Group
5 in lobbying at both European and national levels should not be underestimated. 
 
In the same vein as the 2000 Directives, but without legally binding force – at least for the 
moment – is the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Indeed, the Cologne European Council 
Meeting of 4 June 1999, stated the raison d’être of the Charter to be the “need, at the present 
stage of the Union’s development, to establish a Charter of Fundamental Rights in order to make 
their overriding importance and relevance more visible to the Union’s citizens”.
6 The rights are 
enumerated under six headings – dignity, freedoms, equality, solidarity, citizenship, and justice. 
They include extensive non-discrimination issues, including linguistic diversity; rights to social 
security and healthcare; along with more usual rights covered by the European Convention on 
Human Rights, for example. Furthermore, the Charter is “significant for recognising a number of 
migration-related ‘rights’ that have not in the past been recognised…the right to asylum, the 
right to social security and social advantage after moving to another country, third country 
nationals’ entitlement to equal working conditions”.
7 Whatever the limitations of its 
implementation, at least the Charter indicates a policy orientation and it would be difficult to 
pass legislation in contradiction to it. 
 
Thus, we can see a clear path to EU regulation of a multicultural, multifaith, and generally 
minority-enabling Europe. It restates, and arguably enhances, the shared European commitment 
to human rights, and should make some contribution to checking the rise of xenophobia and 
blame of the non-European ‘Other’. For some commentators, the Charter “is the ultimate proof 
of the focal role that EU citizens have come to play in the European integration process”.
8  
Perhaps this latter point is predictive rather than an accurate assessment of recent history; 
however, as was noted above, three consensual points have revealed themselves in a new 
political and legislative framework. This framework – affecting all residents (citizens and 
denizens) of the European Union – constitutes a new European social citizenship, with more 
meaning and potential than could ever be found in the legalistic formulation of ‘Citizenship of 
the Union’. 
                                                  
5 See I. CHOPIN, «Possible Harmonization of Anti-Discrimination Legislation in the European Union: 
Eutopean and Non-Governmental Proposals», European Journal of Migration and Law 2 (2000), pp. 413-
430. 
6 K. LENAERTS and E. DE SMIJTER, «A “Bill of Rights” for the European Union», Common Market Law 
Review 38 (2001), pp. 273-300, cited as Fn. 37. 
7 S. PEERS, «Immigration, Asylum and the European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights», European 
Journal of Migration and Law 3 (2001), pp. 141-169. 
8 K. LENAERTS and E. DE SMIJTER, op.cit., p. 300.  4
THE ORIGINS OF ANTI-DISCRIMINATION RULES AND THE EQUALITY 
PRINCIPLE 
The principle of equality is first noted after the French Revolution in the Declaration of Human 
Rights of 1789. It reappears in the post-war period in the 1955 European Convention on Human 
Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and more recently the European 
Charter of 2000
9 (see above). However, it would be a mistake to confuse equality with anti-
discrimination policy, since the latter may require unequal treatment and is anyway more 
concerned with procedures than with outcomes.
10 
 
The first appearances of anti-discrimination policy in the 1950s seem to emanate from two quite 
disparate sources, and for very different reasons. In the USA, the domestic issue of repression of 
black Americans and the subsequent civil rights movement led to such policy measures, later 
extended to women; in Sweden, one of the most homogeneous countries of the world, the 
ideology of social democracy viewed the inferior status of women as unacceptable and requiring 
legislative measures. Although starting from the premise of formal equality, neither of these two 
approaches aimed at substantive equality or equality of outcomes. While most national 
constitutions specifically prohibit unequal treatment, only the Italian imposes on the state a duty 
to intervene to remove obstacles to the participation of workers, i.e. it provides for the principle 
of substantive equality.
11 However, the Italian case is interesting in that it focuses upon equality 
of workers, but not of citizens
12 – thus revealing a very different motivation from the social 
citizenship ideology of Sweden or the minority rights base of the USA. 
 
For most countries, anti-discrimination arrived relatively recently: these include Spain (1978)
13, 
Netherlands (1975)
14 and the UK (1970, 1975)
15. Others, such as Germany
16 and France,
17 are 
                                                  
9 E. DOCKÈS, «Equality in Labour Law: An Economically Efficient Human Right? Reflections from a 
French Law Perspective», International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations 
18/2 (2002), pp. 187-196. 
10 H. COLLINS, «Discrimination, Equality and Social Inclusion», Modern Law Review 66 (2003), p. 17. 
11 R. DEL PUNTA, «What has Equality got to do with Labour Law? An Italian Perspective», International 
Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations 18/2 (2002), pp. 197-214. 
12 R. DEL PUNTA, op. cit.  p. 201. 
13 M. R.-P. BRAVO-FERRER and M. R.-P. ROYO, «The Principle of Equality in the Labour Market – 
Reflections on the Spanish Model», International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial 
Relations 18/2 (2002), pp. 169-185. 
14 T. HAVINGA, «The effects and limits of anti-discrimination policy in The Netherlands», International 
Journal of the Sociology of Law 30 (2002), pp. 75-90. 
15 C. BARNARD, S. DEAKIN and C. KILPATRICK, Equality, Non-discrimination and the Labour Market in 
the UK», International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations 18/2 (2002), pp. 
129-147. 
16 U. LIEBERT, «Europeanization and the “Needle’s Eye”: The Transformation of Employment Policy in 
Germany», Review of Policy Research 20/3 (2003), pp. 479-492.  5
even now lagging behind the rest of the EU and importing principles such as the concept of 
indirect discrimination or general socio-political awareness of discrimination issues. However, in 
no country is there an established substantive equality principle: in particular, the USA has high 
occupational segregation of the labour market, with correspondingly high poverty rates, gender 




19 consider there to be a clear tension, or contradiction, between the equality 
principle and liberal market notions. This may well be true in the case of the principle of 
substantive equality, but in practice no capitalist state has attempted to pursue this seriously. In 
the case of France, anti-discrimination is seen as primarily a matter of market access and not of 
redressing factual inequality;
20 in Spain, Netherlands and UK the issue is similar, 
notwithstanding the UK’s 1970 Equal Pay Act.
21 This issue of market access is primarily, 
although not exclusively, associated with the labour market: from a political economy viewpoint, 
we can characterise it as expanding the labour force or (in technical terms) increasing the 
participation rate, most particularly the female and ethnic minority participation rates. 
 
Perhaps surprisingly, the EU directives have been analyzed by some as possessing precisely this 
objective: 
…non-discrimination as a principle of law secures free market access. Thus it not only 
guarantees equal treatrment of persons, but also equal treatment of products. To be precise, 
equal treatment of persons…is only guaranteed if and when persons…enter the market.
22 
 
However, the above quotation is ambiguous regarding EU objectives: is the intent to facilitate 
market access and raise labour market participation rates (as demonstrated historically in 
Sweden, UK, Netherlands, USA et al.) or is it more like the Italian system, which has no 
intention of extending market participation but, rather, aims to secure greater equality of 
outcomes for those already in employment? The distinction is crucial. Recent policy initatives by 
the Commission to increase participation rates significantly
23 suggest that law and policy may 
not be entirely consonant in this matter. 
 
                                                                                                                                                          
17 E. DOCKÈS, op. cit. p. 191. 
18 J. LAPIDUS and D. FIGART, «Remedying “Unfair Acts”: U.S. Pay Equity by Race and Gender», 
Feminist Economics 4/3 (1998), pp. 7-28. 
19 C. BARNARD et al., op. cit.; R. DEL PUNTA op. cit. 
20 E. DOCKÈS, op. cit., pp. 187, 189.  
21 C. BARNARD et al., op. cit.; p. 131. 
22 D. SCHIEK, op. cit., p. 293. 
23 The so-called ‘Lisbon targets’ for 2010  6
Finally, we should mention the Eastern bloc candidate countries. Although explicit and extensive 
anti-discrimination policy is absent, all
24 except Latvia possess constititional protection with 
regard to gender discrimination, and all but Latvia and Poland possess it in respect of racial 
discrimination or religion/religious belief. Furthermore, all but Estonia and Slovakia have 
detailed anti-discrimination clauses in the areas of healthcare, education, consumer protection 
inter alia.
25 Furthermore, specific legislation dealing with discrimination and handicap can be 
found in Bulgaria, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania. These vestigial relics of the 
Communist era suggest that even in the absence of a market economy, full participation in the 
social economy was an explicit aim of many of the regimes: indeed, this was a participation 
which seems to have exceeded that for many west European states, since the Eastern bloc had 
clear coverage of delivery of state services such as healthcare and education.  
 
Social inclusion, or social citizenship (my preferred term), is argued by many
26 as a legitimate 
objective of EU policy, rather than the two narrower views expressed above (namely, higher 
employment rates versus more equal pay for existing workers). Indeed,  a more gloomy 
prognosis is presented by some
27, on the grounds that discrimination on the basis of nationality is 
specifically excluded from the two EU directives. Without a doubt, the intention of European 
national governments, when insisting on this exclusion, was to perpetuate highly segmented 
labour markets, where immigrants are relegated to lower pay and undervalued employment. As 
Lapidus and Figart point out
28, segmented labour markets promote various inequalities along 
with poverty, and study of them is largely absent from the scientific literature. Thus, it seems 
unlikely that the EU directives can achieve more than has already been done at a national level, 
which is largely to increase labour force participation: this topic is examined in more detail 
below. 
 
                                                  
24 Namely, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, 
Slovenia. 
25 M. BELL, «Measures to combat discrimination in the candidate countries – an overview», in European 
Commission, Directorate-General for Employment, Equality, Diversity and Enlargement: Report on 
measures to combat discrimination in  acceding and candidate countries, 2003, Luxembourg, pp. 12-13. 
26 H. COLLINS, op. cit.; M. BELL, «Beyond European Labour Law? Reflections on the EU Racial Equality 
Directive», European Law Journal 8/3 (2002), pp. 384-399. 
27 See e.g. B. HEPPLE, «Race and Law in Fortress Europe», Modern Law Review 67/1 (2004), pp. 1-15. 
28 Fn. 17 supra.  7
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND ANTI-DISCRIMINATION POLICY 
The established economic literature
29 associates increased female labour force participation with 
modernization and industrialization, in which increased demand for female workers in services 
and white-collar work is satisfied by the greater availability of women through increased female 
educational opportunities and a diminishing household role and fertility rate. At lower levels of 
economic development, however, it has been shown that female employment actually declines 
with economic development, owing to reduced work in agriculture and petty trade as these 
sectors transform into a market economy.
30 Thus female labour market participation assumes a 
U-shape as economic development proceeds, with the positive slope of increased female 
employment corresponding to the emergence of post-industrial societies with demand for poorly 
paid, often part-time workers in the service sector. A recent piece of groundbreaking research 
across 136 countries
31 shows clearly through sectoral breakdown that the curvilinear relationship 
is caused by the interaction of two linear ones – declining agricultural employment and 
increasing service employment. Industrial employment of women remains neutral over time. 
Thus, a ‘normal’ pattern of economic development is illustrated by the U-shape for Europe, 
North America and Australia. Two regional/cultural variables show little increase in female 
employment with development: these are Muslim and Latin American countries.  The defining 
factors are: size of the agricultural sector and women’s share of employment in it; and the size of 
the services sector and women’s employment opportunities in that.  
 
The European Patterns 
Taking into account the above empirical-theoretical advances in knowledge, how does the 
European history of anti-discrimination policy fit into female participation in the economy? First, 
we should note that all activity has been post-WWII: this is important, because in WWII women 
were recruited to work in industry, and this change of socio-economic conditions had massive 
ramifications, especially in the UK. By the 1950s, it was not clear that collective memory of 
female work had been lost. 
 
The early Swedish anti-discrimination policy is contemporaneous with its late industrialization; 
however, the peculiar form of Swedish social democratic capitalism allowed the state to recruit 
many (part-time) women into the state sector – an option not available to countries with less 
                                                  
29 E.g. G. STANDING, Labor Force Participation and Development, ILO, Geneva (1981). 
30 R. ANKER and C. HEIN (eds), Sex Inequalities in Urban Employment in the Third World, Macmillan 
(1986). 
31 E. HAGHIGHAT, «Culture, Development and Female Labor Force Participation», International Review 
of Sociology 12/3 (2002), pp. 343-362.  8
interventionist state roles. The next appearance in Europe was in the UK, with the Equal Pay Act 
of 1970. Indeed, this was a significant piece of legislation enacted by the Labour government: in 
practice, it is not clear that it had much impact at all. The subsequent measures – the Sex 
Discrimination Act 1975 and the Race Discrimination Act 1976 – had apparently minimal 
impact in redressing discrimination, but occurred just before the UK’s service sector expansion 
of the 1980s. In the early 1980s the UK manufacturing industrial sector contracted massively, 
and led to very high male unemployment: the expanding services sector was able to pick and 
choose its employees, and tended to go for low-pay part-time female workers. 
 
Across western Europe, the emergence of anti-discrimination measures is intimately connected 
with increased labour market participation of women. Figure 1 shows this trend, in diagrammatic 
form, over two decades. As can be seen quite clearly from Figure 1, in 1967 no country had 
higher than 60% female rate; by 1987 this had risen to 70-80% for the Scandinavian countries. 
There were more modest increases for the Anglophone countries, and fairly small increases for 
continental Europe. Thus, both the rate of increase of female labour market participation and the 
actual level seem to be directly related to the degree of anti-discrimination activism. In other 
words, anti-discrimination policy should not be seen as an issue of group rights and legal 
principles, but as an integral part of capitalist development. A further point to note, is that across 
Europe immigration policy has played a decisive role in affecting the position of women in the 
economy: those countries which pursued a Gastarbeiter policy in the 1960s (Germany, Belgium, 
Switzerland) as well as those which experienced post-colonial immigration in the 1960s and 
1970s (France, Netherlands, UK) were in much less need of female workers. Looking again at 
Figure 1, it is now much easier to understand why advanced economies such as Germany, 
Netherlands and France had such low female participation rates at that time. A final category of 
difference is exemplified by southern Europe with its weakly developed capitalism, or semi-
peripheral status, over much of the post-war period. In this case, the modernizing and contracting 
agricultural sector was creating unemployment, especially of women, and the development of the 
formal services sector had not occurred (and is still largely absent).  9
  10
The Eastern bloc countries 
Throughout the period of socialist command economy management, there appear to be no data 
on participation rates, employment rates etc. There is some limited evidence to suggest that 
throughout the developed Eastern bloc (i.e. excluding Albania and some parts of the former 
Yugoslavia) there was very high employment of women in all sectors, and most notably in 
industry – the latter in clear contrast to Western Europe, apart from the WWII period. The 
evidence presented above on the situation in Eastern Europe is consistent with the important role 
of women in the socialist economies, and also suggests some limited accommodation of 
handicapped persons in the labour force. The role of minorities, Roma and religious groups, 
however, is not something that was consistent with Maxist-Leninist ideology, and we should not 
expect to find practical measures for these groups. 
 
With the 1989 and subsequent revolutions, economic structures largely collapsed with very high 
unemployment and therefore fairly meaningless participation rates. It has only been since the late 
1990s that any semblance of recovery has been evident, and recent data are now available. These 
are presented as employment rates
32, rather than participation rates, in Figure 2 for both East and 




                                                  
32 Defined as % of working age population in employment; participation rates include those also looking 
for work.  11
Socio-economic Outcomes 
From Figure 2, we can see that even after massive economic restructuring in the 1990s, Eastern 
Europe has female employment rates comparable with continental Europe, that is, higher than 
southern Europe and below those of UK, Holland and Scandinavia. (Presumably, the 
participation rates of Eastern Europe are comparable with the North of Europe, owing to the still 
high unemployment in these countries.) The outliers in this figure, therefore, are the three 
southern European countries of Greece, Italy and Spain. 
 
This brings us back to the sectoral issue of employment, and level of economic development as 
identified in the international literature described above. How complete has been the 
modernization of southern European economies, with respect to the development model of 







We can see that agricultural employment in Greece especially, is extremely high; whereas 
services employment is low in Portugal, Greece, Spain and Italy. Thus, it is possible to conclude 
that the transformation of these economies, into advanced capitalist forms, has not occurred. The 
much-needed services sector employment opportunities simply do not exist in southern Europe. 
What have been the consequences of this? One of the perhaps surprising outcomes of this  12
restricted female employment is that the gender pay gap is lower in these countries, as shown in 
Figure 4. This is principally because many of the service sector jobs in northern Europe are part-
time or badly paid, although frequently suiting women with household and family obligations. 
Another surprising outcome is shown in Figure 5, showing income distribution inequalities. 
Here, we see that with the exception of Italy, it is the southern European countries with the most 
unequal income distribution. The cause of this is open to contention, but is probably linked to the 
dependence of most households on male employment along with the heavily segmented nature of 
southern European labour markets. Additionally, we might note the high unemployment of 
women and young people in all of southern Europe, and exceptionally high unemployment of 
medium and high-skilled people in Greece and Spain
33. These factors, along with extensive black 
economy activity and employment of (illegal) immigrants indicate major structural differences 





                                                  
33 M. BALDWIN-EDWARDS, «Southern European Labour Markets and Immigration: A Structural and 
Functional Analysis», in Εργασία 2002 [Employment 2002], Athens: IAPAD, Panteion University [in 







To summarize, we can identify several patterns of economic structure and labour market across 
the European Union. These are shown in Table 1 below. With some partial exceptions (Belgium 
and Italy tend to have variant characteristics, for several reasons), there is a clear positive 
relationship between the extent of anti-discrimination measures, female employment, the gender 
pay gap and the extent of the hi-tech services sector; and these all have a negative 
correspondence with income inequality. The only qualification to this argument lies in 
Scandinavia, where income inequality is low and the gender pay gap is not so large. This would 
appear to reflect the underlying philosophy of social citizenship, an integral part of social 
democratic ideology; its practical implementation may lie in the state sector along with more 




European patterns of labour market and anti-discrimination structures 











Scandinavia  High Low  Strong  Large  Medium￿ 
small 
UK + Netherlands  High High*  Strong  Large Large 
Continental 
Europe 
Medium Medium  Medium  Medium  Medium 
Southern Europe  Low High  Weak  Small  Small￿ 
medium 




WHAT CHANCE OF ANTI-DISCRIMINATION MEASURES IN GREECE? 
We have already seen that Greece qualifies as a southern European country, in terms of the 
characteristics of anti-discrimination and labour market development. However, we can also 
identify some Balkan features of economy and society, which distinguish Greece from Italy, 
Spain and Portugal. A hint of these characteristics is shown by the still overlarge agricultural 
sector employment, which figures massively understate actual employment because of the 
extensive informal and semi-formal employment of immigrants in Greek agriculture.
34 It is not 
the extent of the primary sector which is itself the problem – after all, Spain had such an issue 
until quite recently – but rather the socio-political implications associated with it.  
 
Over the 1990s, agricultural employment in the Balkan countries ranged from 17% in Croatia 
and Slovenia, through 35% in Bulgaria and Romania, up to 58% and 65% in Albania and 
Turkey.
35 Paul Aligica considers the economic systems in the South Eastern Europe region to be 
a form of ‘economic dualism’,
36 which has both direct and spillover effects on the political 
economy and on state policies. In this analysis, he characterizes the agricultural sector as the 
traditional sector, with social exchange mechanisms predominating; and the modern sector as 
                                                  
34 For the most recent empirical survey, see: CH. KASIMIS, A. G. PAPADOPOULOS and E. ZACOPOULOU, 
«Migrants in Rural Greece», Sociologica Ruralis 43/2 (2003), pp. 167-184. 
35. P. D. ALIGICA, «Structural constraints: implications of economic dualism for the development and 
international integration of South Eastern Europe», Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans 5/3 
(2003), p. 306. 
36 Ibid.  15
those activities which have moved to a market system with modern forms of socio-economic 
organization, such as uniformity, modern production and distribution techniques.
37 The 
traditional sectors, according to Aligica, are associated with a specific cultural and behavioural 
pattern, with a nationalist political culture tending to support authoritarianism and collectivism, 
alongside animosity to individual rights and to ethnic and religious diversity and differences. 
Thus, the political culture is shaped and reinforced by a specific economic background: 
resistance to change is not caused by irrational attachments to particular values, but by deep and 
powerful structural forces prevailing in the region. 
 
These cultural features, so succinctly described by Aligica, constitute the major difference 
between Greece and the other southern European countries. Hostility to individual rights has 
been well-documented for Greece,
38 and is a curiosity in modern Europe. Antagonism and 
absolute intolerance of the Greek Roma feature regularly in reports
39 on Greece, alongside the 
difficult relations with Muslims left over from the old Ottoman Empire. Reports of racial 
intolerance and general xenophobia seem to arise consistently from Eurobarometer polls of 
Greeks, yet openly hostile racist acts are almost unknown – in contrast to the rest of Europe. In 
line with this, some commentators
40 have noted the gap between negative social stereotypes and 
individuals’ reported personal experiences of immigrants. Yet another aspect of this dualism is 
the consistent exclusion and maltreatment of migrants and minorities by state authorities, 
alongside a generally more tolerant Greek public.
41 
 
So, what chance for anti-discrimination policy to operate effectively in Greece? The Greek 
labour market is highly segmented, still with little competition and usually permanent jobs for 
those in employment. However, over 40% of Greeks are self-employed and small family firms 
predominate. Interpersonal social networks (clientelism) pervade the society and economy, with 
informal codes of conduct prevailing. Thus, the formal rules of a modern market economy – 
most of which are laid down in Greek law – are continuously and systematically challenged or 
refuted. Here lies the real power of the traditional sector, in opposing modernization and 
markets. 
                                                  
37 Ibid., p. 301. 
38 e.g. A. POLLIS, «Eastern Orthodoxy and Human Rights», Human Rights Quarterly 15/2 (1993), pp. 33-
56 
39 see various reports of Greek Helsinki Monitor (http://www.greekhelsinki.gr ), and the European Roma 
Rights Centre (http://www.errc.org ) 
40 M. BALDWIN-EDWARDS and C. SAFILIOS-ROTHSCHILD, «Unemployment and immigration in Greece: 
attitudes, perceptions and realities», South European Society & Politics 4/3 (1999) pp. 206-221 
41 M. BALDWIN-EDWARDS, Racial Violence: Analytical Study, Greece. Prepared for RAXEN network, 
2003, European Union Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia. 62 pp  16
 
Immigrants, ethnic and religious minorities, and other social ‘misfits’ cannot participate on equal 
terms in the Greek labour market nor do they participate in Greek society. This is a structural 
expression of exclusion from the traditional social networks, and is apparently actively supported 
by the great majority of Greek people. Although the agricultural sector continues to decline in 
the number of employed Greeks, as in the rest of southern Europe
42 it is sustained by the work of 
a large number of (illegal) immigrants. Although the services sector (and to a lesser extent, hi-
tech) continues to grow with increased employment opportunities for Greek women, formal 
child-care facilities are the most inadequate in Europe and immigrant child-minders have 
become the fashion. Thus, it is not possible to describe employment in Greece as market-based: 
it is based on social networks, which systematically exclude non-Greeks and Greek ‘misfits’ 
from everything except the worst types of jobs. However, it would be inaccurate to describe this 
situation as either racist or discriminatory: essentially, it consists of social exclusion. In Greece, 
discrimination (in the positive sense) is the route to employment and status; it is difficult to 
conceive of the meaning of anti-discrimination in such a context. 
 
For the time being, immigrants and other minorities in are caught in a sort of limbo, between the 
traditional exclusionary values of the ‘old’ Greece and the yet-to-happen marketized Greece. 
How, and when, this modernization might occur is not a matter for conjecture from social 




                                                  
42 M. BALDWIN-EDWARDS, «Semi-Reluctant Hosts: Southern Europe’s Ambivalent Response to 
Immigration», Studi Emigrazione 39 (2002), pp. 27-47. 
 